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Abstract
Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock
market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with
existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a consumption-based
asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price
changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other
investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features
of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the
survey evidence on investor expectations.
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1. Introduction
Recent theoretical work on the behavior of aggregate stock market prices has tried
to account for several empirical regularities. These include the excess volatility puzzle of
LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981), the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and
Prescott (1985), the low correlation of stock returns and consumption growth noted by
Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983), and, most importantly, the evidence on predictability
of stock market returns using the aggregate dividend-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller
1988, Fama and French 1988). Both traditional and behavioral models have tried to
account for this evidence.
Yet this research has largely neglected another set of relevant data, namely those
on actual investor expectations of stock market returns. As recently summarized by
Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) using data from multiple investor surveys, many
investors hold extrapolative expectations, believing that stock prices will continue rising
after they have previously risen, and falling after they have previously fallen.
1 This
evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of many of the models used to account for
the other facts about aggregate stock market prices. Indeed, in most traditional models,
investors expect low returns, not high returns, if stock prices have been rising: in these
models, rising stock prices are a sign of lower investor risk aversion or lower perceptions
of risk. Cochrane (2011) finds the survey evidence uncomfortable, and recommends
discarding it.
In this paper, we present a new model of aggregate stock market prices which
attempts to both incorporate extrapolative expectations held by a significant subset of
investors, and address the evidence that other models have sought to explain. The model
includes both rational investors and price extrapolators, and examines security prices
when both types are active in the market. Moreover, it is a consumption-based asset
pricing model with infinitely lived consumers optimizing their decisions in light of their
beliefs and market prices. As such, it can be directly compared to some of the existing
1 Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) analyze data from six different surveys. Some of the surveys are of
individual investors, while others cover institutions. Most of the surveys ask about expectations for the next
year’s stock market performance, but some also include questions about the longer term. The average
investor expectations computed from each of the six surveys are highly correlated with one another and are
all extrapolative. Earlier studies of stock market investor expectations include Vissing-Jorgensen (2004),
Bacchetta, Mertens, and Wincoop (2009), and Amromin and Sharpe (2013).3
research.  We suggest that our model can reconcile the evidence on expectations with the
evidence on volatility and predictability that has animated recent work in this area.
Why is a new model needed? As Table 1 indicates, traditional models of financial
markets have been able to address pieces of the existing evidence, but not the data on
expectations. The same holds true for preference-based behavioral finance models, as
well as for the first generation belief-based behavioral models that focused on random
noise traders without imposing a specific structure on beliefs. Several papers listed in
Table 1 have studied extrapolation of fundamentals. However, these models also struggle
to match the survey evidence: after good stock market returns driven by strong cash
flows, the investors they describe expect higher cash flows, but, because these
expectations are reflected in the current price, they do not expect higher returns.
2 Finally,
a small literature, starting with Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990) and DeLong et al.
(1990b), focuses on models in which some investors extrapolate prices. Our goal is to
write down a more “modern” model of price extrapolation that includes infinite horizon
investors, some of whom are fully rational, who make optimal consumption decisions
given their beliefs, so that the predictions can be directly compared to those of the more
traditional models.
Our infinite horizon continuous-time economy contains two assets: a risk-free
asset with a fixed return; and a risky asset, the stock market, which is a claim to a stream
of dividends and whose price is determined in equilibrium. There are two types of
traders. Both types maximize expected lifetime consumption utility. They differ only in
their expectations about the future. Traders of the first type, “extrapolators,” believe that
the expected price change of the stock market is a weighted average of past price
changes, where more recent price changes are weighted more heavily. Traders of the
second type, “rational traders,” are fully rational: they know how the extrapolators form
2 For example, in the cash-flow extrapolation model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), investors’
expectations of returns remain constant over time, even though their expectations of cash flows vary
significantly. More elaborate models of cash-flow extrapolation – for example, models with both
extrapolators and rational traders – may, as a byproduct, come closer to matching the survey evidence;
here, we present an alternative approach that may be simpler and more direct. Models in which investors
try to learn an unknown cash-flow growth rate face similar challenges to models of cash-flow
extrapolation. Moreover, Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) find that survey expectations of returns are
negatively correlated with subsequent realized returns, a pattern that is hard to sustain in a model of rational
learning.4
their beliefs and trade accordingly. The model is simple enough to allow for a closed-
form solution.
We first use the model to understand how extrapolators and rational traders
interact. Suppose that, at time t, there is a positive shock to dividends. The stock market
goes up in response to this good cash-flow news. However, the extrapolators cause the
price jump to be amplified: since their expectations are based on past price changes, the
stock price increase generated by the good cash-flow news leads them to forecast a higher
future price change on the stock market; this, in turn, causes them to push the time t stock
price even higher.
More interesting is rational traders’ response to this development. We find that
the rational traders do not aggressively counteract the overvaluation caused by the
extrapolators. They reason as follows. The rise in the stock market caused by the good
cash-flow news -- and by extrapolators’ reaction to it -- means that, in the near future,
extrapolators will continue to have bullish expectations for the stock market: after all,
their expectations are based on past price changes, which, in our example, are high. As a
consequence, extrapolators will continue to exhibit strong demand for the stock market in
the near term. This means that, even though the stock market is overvalued at time t, its
returns in the near future will not be particularly low – they will be bolstered by the
ongoing demand from extrapolators. Recognizing this, the rational traders do not sharply
decrease their demand at time t; they only mildly reduce their demand. Put differently,
they only partially counteract the overpricing caused by the extrapolators.
Using a combination of formal propositions and numerical analysis, we then
examine our model’s predictions about prices and returns. We find that these predictions
are consistent with several key facts about the aggregate market and, in particular, with
the basic fact that when prices are high (low) relative to dividends, the stock market
subsequently performs poorly (well). When good cash-flow news is released, the stock
price in our model jumps up more than it would in an economy made up of rational
investors alone: as described above, the price jump caused by the good cash-flow news
feeds into extrapolators’ expectations, which, in turn, generates an additional price
increase. At this point, the stock market is overvalued and prices are high relative to
dividends. Since, subsequent to the overvaluation, the stock market performs poorly on5
average, the level of prices relative to dividends predicts subsequent price changes in our
model, just as it does in actual data. The same mechanism also generates excess volatility
-- stock market prices are more volatile than can be explained by rational forecasts of
future cash flows – as well as negative autocorrelations in price changes at all horizons,
capturing the negative autocorrelations we see at longer horizons in actual data.
The model also matches some empirical facts that, thus far, have been taken as
evidence for other models. For example, in actual data, surplus consumption, a measure
of consumption relative to past consumption, is correlated with the value of the stock
market and predicts the market’s subsequent performance. These facts have been taken as
support for habit-based models. However, they also emerge naturally in our framework.
Our numerical analysis allows us to quantify the effects described above.
Specifically, we use the survey data studied by Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) and
others to parameterize the functional form of extrapolation in our model. For this
parameterization, we find, for example, that if 50% of investors are extrapolators while
50% are rational traders, the standard deviation of annual price changes is 30% higher
than in an economy consisting of rational traders alone.
There are aspects of the data that our model does not address. For example, even
though some of the investors in the economy are price extrapolators, the model does not
predict the positive autocorrelation in price changes observed in the data at very short
horizons. Also, there is no mechanism in our model, other than high risk aversion, that
can generate a large equity premium. And while the presence of extrapolators reduces the
correlation of consumption changes and price changes, this correlation is still much
higher in our model than in actual data.
In summary, our analysis suggests that, simply by introducing some extrapolative
investors into an otherwise traditional consumption-based model of asset prices, we can
make sense not only of some important facts about prices and returns, but also, by
construction, of the available evidence on the expectations of real-world investors. This
suggests that the survey evidence need not be seen as a nuisance, or as an impediment to
understanding the facts about prices and returns. On the contrary, the extrapolation
observed in the survey data is consistent with the facts about prices and returns, and may
be the key to understanding them.6
In Section 2, we present our model and its solution, and discuss some of the basic
insights that emerge from it. In Section 3, we assign values to the model parameters. In
Section 4, we show analytically that the model reproduces several key features of stock
prices. Our focus here is on quantities defined in terms of differences – price changes, for
example; given the structure of the model, these are the natural objects of study. In
Section 5, we use simulations to document the model’s predictions for ratio-based
quantities, such as the price-dividend ratio, that are more commonly studied by
empiricists. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and some discussion of technical issues are
in the Appendix.
2. The Model
In this section, we propose a heterogeneous-agent, consumption-based model in
which some investors extrapolate past price changes when making forecasts about future
price changes. Constructing such a model presents significant challenges, both because of
the heterogeneity across agents, but also because it is the change in price, an endogenous
quantity, that is being extrapolated. By contrast, constructing a model based on
extrapolation of exogenous fundamentals is somewhat simpler. To prevent our model
from becoming too complex, we make some simplifying assumptions – about the
dividend process (a random walk in levels), about investor preferences (exponential
utility), and about the risk-free rate (an exogenous constant). We expect the intuitions of
the model to carry over to more complex formulations.
3
We consider an economy with two assets: a risk-free asset in perfectly elastic
supply with a constant interest rate r; and a risky asset, which we think of as the
aggregate stock market, and which has a fixed per-capita supply of Q. The risky asset is a
claim to a continuous dividend stream whose level per unit time evolves as an arithmetic
Brownian motion
, t D D dD g dt d     (1)
3 Several other models of the aggregate stock market make similar assumptions; see, for example,
Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Wang (1993). We discuss the constant interest rate assumption at the end of
Section 2.7
where D g and D  are the expected value and standard deviation of dividend changes,
respectively, and where  is a standard one-dimensional Wiener process. Both D g and D 
are constant in our model. The value of the stock market at time t is denoted by Pt and is
determined endogenously in equilibrium.
There are two types of infinitely-lived traders in the economy: “extrapolators” and
“rational traders.” Both types maximize expected lifetime consumption utility. The only
difference between them is that one type has correct beliefs about the expected price
change of the risky asset, while the other type does not.
The modeling of extrapolators is motivated by the survey evidence analyzed by
Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), Bacchetta, Mertens, and Wincoop (2009), Amromin and
Sharpe (2013), and Greenwood and Shleifer (2013). These investors form beliefs about
the future price change of the stock market by extrapolating the market’s past price
changes. To formalize this, we introduce a measure of “sentiment,” defined as:
( ) 0, ,
t t s
t s dt e S dP
 
 

     (2)
where s is the running variable for the integral. St is simply a weighted average of past
price changes on the stock market where the weights decrease exponentially the further
back we go into the past. The definition of St includes even the most recent price change,
dPtdt Pt Ptdt. The parameter  plays an important role in our model. When it is high,
sentiment is determined primarily by the most recent price changes; when it is low, even
price changes in the distant past have a significant effect on current sentiment. In Section
3, we use survey data to estimate .
We assume that extrapolators’ expectation of the change, per unit time, in the
value of the stock market, is
, 0 1 [ ]/ ,
e e
P t t t t g dP dt S       (3)
where the superscript “e” is an abbreviation for “extrapolator,” and where, for now, the
only requirement we impose on the constant parameters 0 and 1is that 1 0. Taken
together, equations (2) and (3) capture the essence of the survey results in Greenwood
and Shleifer (2013): if the stock market has been rising, extrapolators expect it to keep
rising; and if it has been falling, they expect it to keep falling. While we leave 0 and 18
unspecified for now, natural values are 0 0 and 1 1, and these are indeed the values
that we use later.
4
We do not take a strong stand on the underlying source of the extrapolative
expectations in (3). One possible source is a judgment heuristic such as
representativeness, or the closely-related “belief in the law of small numbers” (Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Rabin 2002). For example, people who believe in the law of
small numbers think that even short samples will resemble the parent population from
which they are drawn. As a consequence, when they see good recent returns in the stock
market, they infer that it must currently have a high average return and will therefore
continue to perform well.
5
The second type of investor, the rational trader, has correct beliefs about the
evolution of future stock prices. By correctly conjecturing the equilibrium price process,
the rational investors take full account of extrapolators’ endogenous responses to price
movements at all future times.
There is a continuum of both rational traders and extrapolators in the economy.
Each investor, whether a rational trader or an extrapolator, takes the risky asset price as
given when making his trading decision, and has CARA preferences with absolute risk
aversion  and time discount factor .
6 At time 0, each extrapolator maximizes
0
0
e
t t C
e e
dt
     
 
   

 
 (4)
subject to his budget constraint
( )(1 )
,
e e e
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e e e e
t t
e
t
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rW dt C dt rN Pdt N dP N D
W
dt
         
    

(5)
where
e
t N is the per-capita number of shares he invests in the risky asset at time t.
Similarly, at time 0, each rational trader maximizes
4 When 0and 1 equal 0 and 1, respectively, extrapolators’ beliefs are correct on average: while these
investors overestimate the subsequent price change of the stock market after good past price changes and
underestimate it after poor past price changes, the errors in their forecasts average out to zero in the long
run.
5 Another possible source of extrapolative expectations is the experience effect analyzed by Malmendier
and Nagel (2011). One caveat is that, as we show later, the investor expectations documented in surveys
depend primarily on recent past returns, while in Malmendier and Nagel’s (2011) results, distant past
returns also play a significant role.
6 The model remains analytically tractable even if the two types of investors have different values of  or .9
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(7)
where
r
t N is the per-capita number of shares he invests in the risky asset at time t, and
where the superscript “r” is an abbreviation for “rational trader.” Since rational traders
correctly conjecture the price process Pt, their expectation is consistent with that of an
outside econometrician.
We assume that rational traders make up a fraction , and extrapolators 1  , of
the total investor population. The market clearing condition that must hold at each time
is:
(1 ) ,
r e
t t Q N N      (8)
where, as noted above, Q is the per-capita supply of the risky asset.
We assume that both extrapolators and rational traders observe Dt and Pt on a
continuous basis. Moreover, they know the values of μ and Q, and traders of one type
understand how traders of the other type form beliefs about the future.
7
Using the stochastic dynamic programming approach developed in Merton
(1971), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Model solution). In the heterogeneous-agent model described above, the
equilibrium price of the risky asset is
.
t
t t
D
A BS
r
P    (9)
The price of the risky asset Pt and the sentiment variable St evolve according to
,
1 (1 ) (1 )
t t
D D g B
dP S dt d
B B r B r
   
           
(10)
7 As in any framework with less than fully rational traders, the extrapolators could, in principle, come to
learn that their beliefs about the future are inaccurate. We do not study this learning process; rather, we
study the behavior of asset prices when extrapolators are unaware of the bias in their beliefs.10
.
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At time t, the value functions for the extrapolators and the rational traders are
,
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The optimal per-capita share demands for the risky asset from the extrapolators and from
the rational traders are
0 1
1
, ,
e e e r e
t t t t
Q
S N N N

  
 

   (13)
and the optimal consumption flows of the two types are
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where the optimal wealth levels,
e
t W and ,
r
t W evolve as in (5) and (7), respectively. The
coefficients A, B, ,
e a ,
e b ,
e c ,
r a ,
r b ,
r c 0
e  and 1
e  are determined through a system of
simultaneous equations. 
To understand the role that extrapolators play in our model, we compare the
model’s predictions to those of a benchmark “rational” economy, in other words, an
economy where all traders are of the fully rational type, so that   1.
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Corollary 1 (Rational benchmark). If all traders in the economy are rational (  1), the
equilibrium price of the risky asset is
8 Another way of reducing our model to a fully rational economy is to set 0 and 1, the parameters in (3),
to gD/r and 0, respectively. In this case, both the rational traders and the extrapolators have the same,
correct beliefs about the expected price change of the risky asset per unit time.11
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and therefore evolves according to
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The value function for the rational traders is
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The optimal consumption flow is
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where the optimal wealth level, ,
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
2.1. Discussion
In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss the model’s implications in detail. However, the
closed-form solution in Proposition 1 already makes apparent its basic properties.
Comparing equations (9) and (15), we see that, up to a constant, the effect of
extrapolators on the risky asset price is given by the term BSt in equation (9), where, for
all of the basic parameter values we have considered, the coefficient B is positive.
Intuitively, if the sentiment level St is high, indicating that past price changes have been
high, extrapolators expect the stock market to continue to perform well and therefore
push its current price higher.
Equation (11) shows that, in equilibrium, the sentiment St follows a mean-
reverting process, one that reverts more rapidly to its mean as β increases. Put differently,
the mispricing BSt generated by extrapolators is eventually corrected, and more quickly
so for high values of β. To see this – in other words, to understand why, in our
framework, bubbles eventually burst – recall that an overpricing occurs when good cash-12
flow news generates a price increase that then feeds into extrapolators’ beliefs, leading
them to push prices still higher. The form of extrapolation in equation (2), however,
means that as time passes, the price increase caused by the good cash-flow news plays a
smaller and smaller role in determining extrapolators’ beliefs. As a result, these investors
become less bullish over time, and the bubble deflates. This happens more rapidly when β
is high because, in this case, extrapolators quickly “forget” all but the most recent price
changes.
Comparing equations (10) and (16), we see that, as noted in the Introduction, the
presence of extrapolators amplifies the volatility of price changes – specifically, by a
factor of 1/(1  B) > 1. And while in an economy made up of rational investors alone,
price changes are not predictable -- see equation (16) -- equation (10) shows that they are
predictable in the presence of extrapolators. If the stock market has recently experienced
good returns, so that the sentiment variable St has a high value, the subsequent stock
market return is low on average: the coefficient on St in equation (10) is negative. In
short, high valuations in the stock market are followed by low returns, and low valuations
are followed by high returns. This anticipates some of our results on stock market
predictability in Sections 4 and 5.
Equation (13) shows that extrapolators’ share demand is a positive linear function
of the sentiment level St: for all values of the basic model parameters we have considered,
the derived parameter 1
e  is positive. In other words, after a period of good stock market
performance, one that generates a high sentiment level St, extrapolators form more bullish
expectations of future price changes and increase the number of shares of the stock
market that they hold. With a fixed supply of these shares, this automatically means that
the share demand of rational traders varies negatively with the sentiment variable St:
rational traders absorb the shocks in extrapolators’ demand. While extrapolators’ beliefs
are, by definition, extrapolative, rational traders’ beliefs are contrarian: their beliefs are
based on the true price process (10) whose drift depends negatively on St.
9
9 Since the supply of the risky asset is fixed and there are only two groups of traders, the share demand of
rational traders must vary negatively with the sentiment level. In a stripped-down version of our
framework, we have also analyzed what happens when there are three types of traders: the two types we
examine here, but also a group of partially-rational investors who buy (sell) the risky asset when its price is
low (high) relative to fundamentals. We find that, in this economy, the share demand of the fully rational
traders is positively related to the sentiment level. In other words, consistent with the prediction of DeLong13
Equation (18) shows that, in the fully rational economy, optimal consumption is a
constant plus the product of wealth and the interest rate. Equation (14) shows that, when
extrapolators are present in the economy, the consumption policy of each type of agent
also depends on linear and quadratic terms in St. We find that the derived parameters ,
e a
,
r a ,
e b and
r b in equation (14) typically satisfy 0,
e a  0,
r a  and .
e r b b  The fact that
e r b b  indicates that extrapolators increase their consumption more than rational traders
do after strong stock market returns. After strong returns, extrapolators expect the stock
market to continue to rise; an income effect therefore leads them to consume more.
Rational traders, on the other hand, correctly perceive low future returns and therefore do
not raise their consumption as much. The fact that
e a and
r a are both negative indicates
that, as sentiment increases in absolute magnitude, both types increase their consumption.
When St takes either a very high or a very low value, both types perceive the stock
market to be severely misvalued and therefore expect their respective investment
strategies to perform well in the future. This, in turn, leads them to raise their
consumption.
Since extrapolators have incorrect beliefs about future price changes, it is likely
that, in the long run, their wealth will decline relative to that of rational traders. However,
the price process in (10) is unaffected by the relative wealth of the two trader types: under
exponential utility, the share demand of each type, and hence also prices, are independent
of wealth. The exponential utility assumption allows us to abstract from the effect of
“survival” on prices, and to focus on what happens when both types of trader play a role
in setting prices.
At the heart of our model is an amplification mechanism: if good cash-flow news
pushes the stock market up, this price increase feeds into extrapolators’ expectations
about future price changes, which then leads them to push current prices up even higher.
However, this then further increases extrapolators’ expectations about future price
changes, leading them to push the current price still higher, and so on. Given this infinite
feedback loop, it is important to ask whether the heterogeneous agent equilibrium we
et al. (1990b) and the findings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), these traders “ride the bubble” generated
by extrapolators.14
described above exists. The following corollary provides a condition for existence of
equilibrium.
Corollary 2 (Existence of equilibrium). The equilibrium described in Proposition 1
exists if and only if 1  |B|  0. When   0 (all investors are extrapolators), the
equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists if and only if
1 , r   (20)
assuming that 1  2. 
Corollary 2 shows that, when all investors in the economy are extrapolators, there
may be no equilibrium even for reasonable parameter values; loosely put, the feedback
loop described above may fail to converge. For example, if 1 = 1 and  = 0.5, there is no
equilibrium in the case of   0 if the interest rate is less than 50%. However, if even a
small fraction of investors are rational traders, the equilibrium is very likely to exist.
Indeed, for   0.05, we have found an equilibrium for all the parameter values we have
tried.
One of the assumptions of our model is that the risk-free rate is constant. To
evaluate this assumption, we compute the aggregate demand for the risk-free asset across
the two types of trader. We find that this aggregate demand is very stable over time and,
in particular, that it is uncorrelated with the sentiment level St. This is because the
demand for the risk-free asset from one type of trader is largely offset by the demand
from the other type: when sentiment St is high, rational traders increase their demand for
the risk-free asset (and move out of the stock market), while extrapolators reduce their
demand for the risk-free asset (and move into the stock market). When sentiment is low,
the reverse occurs. This suggests that, even if the risk-free rate were endogenously
determined, it would not fluctuate wildly, nor would its fluctuations significantly
attenuate the effects we describe here.
Our model is similar in some ways to that of Campbell and Kyle (1993) – a model
in which, as in our framework, the risk-free rate is constant, the level of the dividend on
the risky asset follows an arithmetic Brownian motion, and infinitely-lived rational15
investors with exponential utility interact with less rational investors. The difference
between the two models – and it is an important difference – is that, in Campbell and
Kyle (1993), the share demand of the less rational investors is exogenously assumed to
follow a mean-reverting process, while, in our model, extrapolators’ share demand is
derived from their beliefs.
3. Parameter Values
In this section, we assign benchmark values to the basic model parameters. We
use these values in the numerical simulations of Section 5. However, we also use them in
Section 4. While the core of that section consists of analytical propositions, we can get
more out of the propositions by evaluating the expressions they contain for specific
parameter values.
For easy reference, we list the model parameters in Table 2. The asset-level
parameters are the risk-free rate r; the initial level of the dividend 0; D the mean D g and
standard deviation D  of dividend changes; and the risky asset supply Q. The investor-
level parameters are the initial wealth levels for the two types of agents, 0
e W and 0 ;
r W
absolute risk aversion  and the time discount rate ; 0 and 1, which link the sentiment
variable to extrapolators’ beliefs; , which governs the relative weighting of recent and
distant past price changes in the definition of sentiment; and finally, μ, the proportion of
rational traders in the economy.
10
We set r = 2.5%, consistent with the low historical risk-free rate. We set the initial
dividend level 0 D to 10, and given this, we choose 0.25; D   in other words, we choose
a volatility of dividend changes small enough to ensure that we only rarely encounter
negative dividends and prices in the simulations we conduct in Section 5. We set
0.05 D g  to match, approximately, the empirical ratio of / D D g  in the data. Finally, we
set the risky asset supply to Q  5.
We now turn to the investor-level parameters. We set the initial wealth levels to
0 0
e r W W  5000; these values imply that, at time 0, the value of the stock market
10 For much of the analysis, we do not need to assign specific values to 0, D 0,
e W and 0 ;
r W the values of these
variables are required only for the simulations in Section 5.16
constitutes approximately half of aggregate wealth. We set risk aversion  equal to 0.1 so
that relative risk aversion, computed from the value function as ,
WW
W
WJ
RRA
J
r W     is
12.5 at the initial wealth levels. And we choose a low time discount rate of  = 1.5%,
consistent with most other asset pricing frameworks.
This leaves four parameters: 0, 1, , and μ. As shown in equation (3), 0 and 1
determine the link between the sentiment variable St and extrapolators’ beliefs. We use 0
 0 and 1  1 as our benchmark values. The integral sum of the weights on past price
changes in the definition of sentiment in (2) is equal to one; informally, St represents “one
unit” of price change. It is therefore natural for extrapolators to scale St by 1  1 when
forecasting a unit price change in the future. Given this value of 1, we set 0  0 because
this ensures that extrapolators’ beliefs are correct “on average”: while extrapolators
overestimate the subsequent price change of the stock market after good past price
changes and underestimate it after poor past price changes, the errors in their forecasts of
future price changes over any finite horizon will, in the long run, average out to zero.
11
The parameter  determines the relative weight extrapolators put on recent as
opposed to distant past price changes when forming expectations about the future; a high
value of  means a higher relative weight on recent price changes. To estimate , we use
the time-series of investor expectations from the Gallup surveys studied by Greenwood
and Shleifer (2013). We describe the estimation procedure in detail in the Appendix. In
brief, we run a regression of the average investor expectation of the price change in the
stock market over the next year, as recorded in the surveys, on what our model says
extrapolators’ expectation of this quantity should be at that time as a function of the
sentiment level and the model parameters. If the average investor expectation of the
future price change that we observe in the surveys depends primarily on recent past price
changes, the estimated  will be high. Conversely, if it depends to a significant extent on
price changes in the distant past, the estimated  will be low. The estimation makes use
11 We have also used the survey evidence to estimate 0 and 1 and find the estimated values to be close to
zero and one; see the Appendix for more details. The results we present in Sections 4 and 5 are similar
whether we use the estimated values or zero and one.17
of Proposition 2 below, and specifically, equation (22), which describes the price change
expected by extrapolators over any future horizon.
Proposition 2 (Price change expectations of rational traders and extrapolators).
Conditional on an initial sentiment level S0  s, rational traders’ expectation of the price
change in the stock market over the finite time horizon (0, t1) is:
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while extrapolators’ expectation of the same quantity is:
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and m  (1  1). When 0 0 and 1 1, (22) reduces to
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
Equations (21) and (22) confirm that the expectations of extrapolators load positively on
the sentiment level, while the expectations of rational traders load negatively.
When we use the procedure described in the Appendix to estimate  from the
survey data, we obtain a value of approximately 0.5. For this value of , extrapolators’
expectations depend primarily on recent past price changes; specifically, when forming
their expectations, extrapolators weight the realized annual price change in the stock
market starting four years ago only 22% as much as the most recent annual price change.
While we pay most attention to the case of   0.5, we also present results for   0.05
and   0.75. When   0.05, the annual price change four years ago is weighted 86% as
much as the most recent annual price change, and when   0.75, only 11% as much.
12
12 When we estimate , we assume that the surveyed investors correspond to the extrapolators in our model:
after all, the presence of extrapolators in our economy is motivated precisely by the survey evidence. If we
instead assumed that the surveyed investors correspond to all investors in our model, we would likely
obtain a similar value of . Since rational traders’ beliefs are the “mirror image” of extrapolators’ beliefs,
they weight past price changes in a similar way when forming their expectations.18
The final parameter is μ, the fraction of rational investors in the economy. We do
not take a strong stand on its value. While the average investor expectation in the survey
data is robustly extrapolative, it is hard to know how representative the surveyed
investors are of the full investor population. In our analysis, we therefore consider a range
of values of μ: 1 (an economy where all investors are fully rational), 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25.
We do not consider the case of   0 because Corollary 2 indicates that, when all
investors are extrapolators, the equilibrium does not exist for reasonable values of  and
1. While we consider four different values of μ, we focus on the lower two values,
namely 0.5 and 0.25. The fact that the average investor in the surveys studied by
Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) – surveys that include both sophisticated and less
sophisticated respondents – exhibits extrapolative expectations suggests that many
investors in actual financial markets are extrapolators.
For a given set of values of the basic parameters in Table 2, we solve a system of
simultaneous equations, as outlined in the Appendix, to compute the “derived”
parameters: 0
e  and 1,
e  which determine extrapolators’, and hence rational traders’, optimal
share demand (see equation (13)); ,
e a ,
e b ,
e c ,
r a
r b and ,
r c which determine investors’
optimal consumption policies (see equation (14)); A and B, which specify how the price
level P depends on the level of the sentiment S and the level of the dividend D (see
equation (9)); and finally , P  the volatility of price changes in the stock market (see
equation (10)). For example, if   0.25,   0.5, and the other basic parameters have the
values shown in Table 2, the values of the derived parameters are:
0 1
3 3 3
1.54, 0.51, 19.75, 117.04, 0.99,
1.22 , 1.28 , 7.31 , 0.042,
1.63, 3.47.
10 10 10
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Before we turn to the empirical implications of our model, we make one more
observation about investor expectations. Proposition 2 confirms that extrapolators’
expectations about future price changes depend positively on the level of sentiment,
while rational traders’ expectations are negatively related to sentiment. A natural question
is: Is the expectation of future price changes, averaged across all investors, extrapolative
or contrarian? Interestingly, we find that this average expectation – specifically, the19
population-weighted average of the expressions in equations (21) and (22) – depends
positively on the sentiment level for any   1; in other words, if there are any
extrapolators at all in the economy, the average investor expectation is extrapolative. The
reason for this is that, while extrapolators hold extrapolative beliefs and rational traders
hold contrarian beliefs, rational traders are always less contrarian than extrapolators are
extrapolative. One implication of this result is that the extrapolation observed in the
survey data does not necessarily mean that most investors in the economy hold incorrect,
extrapolative beliefs; it is in principle consistent with the presence of relatively few
extrapolators in the economy. However, the economic magnitude and robustness of the
extrapolation in all six surveys studied by Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) leads us to
focus on lower values of  in the results we present in Sections 4 and 5.
4. Empirical Implications
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the empirical predictions of the
model. Under the assumptions that the dividend level follows an arithmetic Brownian
motion and that investors have exponential utility, it is more natural, in our analysis, to
work with quantities defined in terms of differences rather than ratios – for example, to
work with price changes Pt  P0 rather than returns; and with the “price-dividend
difference” P  D/r rather than the price-dividend ratio. For example, Corollary 1 shows
that, in the benchmark rational economy, it is P  D/r that is constant over time, not P/D.
In this section, then, we study the predictions of price extrapolation for these difference-
based quantities. In Section 5, we also consider the ratio-based quantities.
We study the implications of the model for the difference-based quantities with
the help of formal propositions. For example, if we are interested in the autocorrelation of
price changes, we first compute this autocorrelation analytically, and then report its value
for the parameter values in Table 2. For two crucial parameters, μ and β, we consider a
range of possible values. Recall that μ is the fraction of rational traders in the overall
investor population, while β controls the relative weighting of near-past and distant-past
price changes in extrapolators’ forecast of future price changes.
We are interested in how the presence of extrapolators in the economy affects the
behavior of the stock market. To understand this more clearly, in the results that we20
present below, we always include, as a benchmark, the case of   1, in other words, the
case where the economy consists entirely of rational traders.
4.1. Predictive power of D/r  P for future price changes
A basic fact about the stock market is that the dividend-price ratio of the stock
market predicts subsequent returns with a positive sign; moreover, the ratio’s predictive
power is greater at longer horizons. In the context of our model, the natural analogs of the
dividend-price ratio and of returns are the dividend-price difference D/r  P and price
changes, respectively. We therefore examine whether, in our economy, the dividend-price
difference predicts subsequent price changes with a positive sign, and whether this
predictive power is greater at longer horizons.
It is helpful to express the long-horizon evidence in the more structured way
suggested by Cochrane (2011), among others. If we run three univariate regressions – a
regression of future returns on the current dividend-price ratio; a regression of future
dividend growth on the current dividend-price ratio; and a regression of the future
dividend-price ratio on the current dividend-price ratio – then, as a matter of accounting,
the three regression coefficients must (approximately) sum to one. Empirically, the three
regression coefficients are roughly 1, 0, and 0, respectively, at long horizons. In other
words, at long horizons, the dividend-price ratio forecasts future returns – not future cash
flows, and not its own future value.
We can restate this point in a way that fits more naturally with our model, using
quantities defined as differences, rather than ratios. Given the accounting identity
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it is immediate that if we run three regressions – of the future price change, the (negative)
future dividend change, and the future dividend-price difference, on the current dividend-
price difference – the population values of the three coefficients will sum to one in our
economy, at any horizon. To match the empirical facts, our model needs to predict a21
regression coefficient in the first regression that, at long horizons, is approximately equal
to one.
13 The next proposition shows that this is exactly the case.
Proposition 3 (The predictive power of D/r  P). Consider a regression of the price
change in the stock market over some time horizon (0, t1) on the level of D/r  P at the
start of the horizon. In population, the coefficient on the independent variable in the
regression is
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Proposition 3 shows that, in our model, and consistent with the empirical facts,
the coefficient in a regression of price changes on the dividend-price difference is
positive and increases at longer horizons, rising in value asymptotically toward one.
These patterns are clearly visible in Table 3, which reports the value of the regression
coefficient in Proposition 3 for various values of μ and β, and for five different time
horizons: a quarter, a year, two years, three years, and four years. In the benchmark
rational economy (  1), the quantity D/r  P is constant; the regression coefficient in
Proposition 3 is therefore undefined.
The intuition for why D/r  P predicts subsequent price changes is
straightforward. A sequence of good cash flow news pushes up stock prices, which then
raises extrapolators’ expectations about the future price change of the stock market and
causes them to push stock prices even higher, lowering the value of D/r  P. Since the
13 If the coefficient in the first regression is approximately one, this immediately implies that the
coefficients in the second and third regressions are approximately zero, consistent with the evidence. The
coefficient in the second regression is exactly zero because dividend changes are unpredictable in our
economy. The coefficient in the third regression is then one minus the coefficient in the first regression; if
the latter is approximately one, the former is approximately zero.
14 The expectations that we compute in the propositions in Section 4 are taken over the steady-state
distribution of the sentiment level S. Ergodicity of the stochastic process St guarantees that sample statistics
will converge to our analytical results for very large samples.22
stock market is now overvalued, the subsequent price change is low, on average. The
quantity D/r  P therefore forecasts price changes with a positive sign.
The table shows that, for a fixed horizon, the predictive power of D/r  P is
stronger for low : since the predictability of price changes is driven by the presence of
extrapolators, it is natural that this predictability is stronger when there are more
extrapolators in the economy. The predictive power of D/r  P is also weaker for low :
when  is low, extrapolators’ beliefs are more persistent; as a result, it takes longer for an
overvaluation to correct, reducing the predictive power of D/r  P for price changes at
any fixed horizon.
4.2. Autocorrelations of P  D/r
In the data, price-dividend ratios are highly autocorrelated at short lags. We would
like to know if our model can capture this. The natural analog of the price-dividend ratio
in our model is the difference-based quantity P  D/r. We therefore examine the
autocorrelation structure of this quantity.
In our discussion of the accounting identity in equation (25), we noted that, if we
run regressions of the future change in the stock price, the future change in dividends,
and the future dividend-price difference on the current dividend-price difference, then the
three regression coefficients we obtain must sum to one. Since dividends follow a random
walk in our model, we know that the coefficient in the second regression is zero. We also
know, from Proposition 3, that the coefficient in the first regression is
1 1 .
kt e
  The
coefficient in the third regression, which is also the autocorrelation of the price-dividend
difference P  D/r, must therefore equal
1.
kt e
 The next proposition confirms this.
Proposition 4 (Autocorrelations of P  D/r). In population, the autocorrelation of P 
D/r at a time lag of t1 is
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In Table 4, we compute the autocorrelations in Proposition 4 for several pairs of
values of  and , and for lags of one quarter, one year, two years, three years, and four
years. The table shows that, in our model, and consistent with the empirical facts, the
price-dividend difference is highly persistent at short horizons, while at long horizons, the
autocorrelation drops to zero. The table shows that the autocorrelations are higher for low
values of : when  is low, extrapolators’ beliefs are very persistent, which, in turn,
imparts persistence to the price-dividend difference.
4.3. Volatility of price changes and of P  D/r
Empirically observed stock market returns and price-dividend ratios are thought
to exhibit “excess volatility,” in other words, to be more volatile than can be explained
purely by fluctuations in rational expectations about future cash flows. We now show
that, in our model, price changes and the price-dividend difference – the natural analogs
of returns and of the price-dividend ratio in our framework – also exhibit such excess
volatility. In particular, they are more volatile than in the benchmark rational economy
described in Corollary 1, an economy where prices changes are due only to changes in
rational forecasts of future cash flows.
Proposition 5 (Excess volatility). In the economy of Section 2, the standard deviation of
price changes over a finite time horizon (0, t1) is
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while the standard deviation of P  D/r over (0, t1) is
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Table 5 reports the standard deviation of annual price changes and of the annual
price-dividend difference P  D/r for several (, ) pairs. Panel A shows that, in the fully
rational economy (  1), the standard deviation of annual price changes is 10, in other24
words, D/r. When extrapolators are present, however, the standard deviation is
considerably higher: 30% higher when there are an equal number of extrapolators and
rational traders in the economy, a figure that, as we explain below, depends little on the
parameter . Similarly, Panel B shows that while the price-dividend difference is constant
in the fully rational economy, it varies significantly in the presence of extrapolators.
The results in Proposition 5 and in Table 5 confirm the intuition we described in
the Introduction, namely that the presence of extrapolators amplifies the volatility of
stock prices. A good cash flow shock pushes stock prices up and immediately leads
extrapolators to expect higher future stock price changes, which, in turn, leads them to
push current stock prices up even further. Rational investors counteract this
overvaluation, but only mildly so: since they understand how extrapolators form beliefs,
they know that extrapolators will continue to have optimistic beliefs about the stock
market in the near future, which, in turn, means that subsequent price changes, while
lower than average, will not be very low. As a consequence, rational investors do not
push back strongly against the overvaluation caused by the extrapolators. Put differently,
even if the fraction of extrapolators in the overall population is low, this can be sufficient
to significantly amplify the volatility of the stock market.
In Table 5, as expected, the greater the fraction of extrapolators in the economy,
the more “excess volatility” there is in price changes and in the price-dividend difference.
More interesting, the amount of excess volatility is largely insensitive to the parameter .
This may seem surprising at first: since extrapolators’ beliefs are more variable when  is
high, one might have thought that a higher  would correspond to higher price volatility.
However, another force pushes in the opposite direction: rational traders know that,
precisely because extrapolators change their beliefs more quickly when  is high, any
mispricing caused by the extrapolators will correct more quickly in this case. As a
consequence, when  is high, rational traders trade more aggressively against the
extrapolators, dampening volatility. Overall,  has little effect on volatility.
Does the higher price volatility generated by extrapolators leave the rational
traders worse off? It does not. Specifically, we find that, if we start with an economy
consisting of only rational traders and then gradually add more extrapolators while
keeping the per-capita supply of the risky asset constant, the value function of the rational25
traders increases in value. In other words, while the higher price volatility lowers rational
traders’ utility, this is more than compensated for by the higher profits the rational traders
expect to make by exploiting the extrapolators.
4.4. Autocorrelations of price changes
Empirically, returns on the stock market are positively autocorrelated at short
lags; at longer lags, they are negatively autocorrelated (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers
1991). We now examine what our model predicts about the autocorrelation structure of
the analogous quantity to returns in our framework, namely price changes.
Proposition 6 (Autocorrelations of price changes). In population, the autocorrelation of
price changes between (0, t1) and (t2, t3), where t2  t1, is
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In Table 6, we use Proposition 6 to compute the autocorrelation of price changes
for several pairs of values of  and , and at lags of one, two, three, four, eight, and
twelve quarters. The table shows that price changes are negatively autocorrelated at all
lags, with the autocorrelation tending to zero at long lags.
It is easy to see why, in our model, price changes are negatively autocorrelated at
longer lags. Suppose that there is good cash flow news at time t. The stock market goes
up in response to this news; but since this price rise causes extrapolators to expect higher
future price changes, they push the stock market even further up. Now that the stock26
market is overvalued, the long-term future price change is lower, on average. In other
words, past price changes clearly have negative predictive power for price changes that
are some way into the future.
Negative autocorrelations are indeed observed in the data, at longer lags; to some
extent, then, our model matches the data. However, there is also a way in which our
model does not match the data: actual returns are positively autocorrelated at the first
quarterly lag, while the price changes generated by our model are not.
It may initially be surprising that our model generates negative autocorrelations in
price changes even at the shortest lags. The reason for this prediction is that, as laid out in
equations (2) and (3), the weights extrapolators put on past price changes when they form
expectations decline the further back we go into the past. Consider again a good cash-
flow shock at time t that, as described above, feeds into extrapolators’ expectations and
amplifies the contemporaneous price change. The weighting scheme in equation (2)
means that, even an instant later, the positive time t price change that caused
extrapolators to become more bullish plays a smaller role in determining their
expectations; extrapolators therefore become a little less bullish, and there is a price
reversal.
The above discussion clarifies why some earlier models of return extrapolation –
for example, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), DeLong et al. (1990b), Hong and
Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003) – do generate positive short-term
autocorrelation. In these models, the weights extrapolators put on past price changes
when deciding on their share demand typically do not decline monotonically, the further
back we go into the past. In particular, in these models, extrapolators’ share demand at
time t depends on the lagged price change from time t  2 to time t  1; the lagged price
change therefore matters more than the more recent price change from t  1 to t in
determining share demand. This assumption generates positive short-term
autocorrelation: a price increase at time t  1 feeds into extrapolators’ share demand only
at time t, generating another price increase at that time. This suggests that an extension of
our model in which extrapolators react to past price changes with some delay when
forming their expectations may generate both negative long-term and positive short-term
autocorrelations in price changes. We do not pursue this approach here, however: doing27
so would greatly complicate the analysis while improving the model’s explanatory power
in only a minor way.
4.5. Correlation of consumption changes and price changes
Another quantity of interest is the correlation of consumption growth and returns.
In the data, this correlation is low. We now look at what our model predicts about the
analogous quantity: the correlation of consumption changes and price changes.
Proposition 7 (Correlation between consumption changes and price changes). In
population, the correlation between the change in consumption and the change in price
over a finite time horizon 1 (0, ) t is
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Panels A and B of Table 7 use Proposition 7 to compute the correlation of
consumption changes and price changes at a quarterly and annual frequency,
respectively, and for several (, ) pairs. The two panels show that, while the presence of
extrapolators slightly reduces this correlation relative to its value in the fully rational
economy, the correlation is nonetheless high. As is the case for virtually all consumption-
based asset pricing models, then, our model fails to match the low correlation of
consumption growth and returns in the data.
4.6. Predictive power of the surplus consumption ratio
Prior empirical research has shown that a variable called the “surplus
consumption ratio” – a measure of consumption relative to past consumption levels, is
contemporaneously correlated with the price-dividend ratio on the overall stock market;
and furthermore, that it predicts subsequent returns with a negative sign (Campbell and
Cochrane 1999, Cochrane 2011). These findings have been taken as support for habit-
based models of the aggregate stock market. We show, however, that these patterns also
emerge from our model.29
As we have done throughout this section, we study difference-based quantities:
the surplus consumption difference rather than the surplus consumption ratio. Moreover,
we focus on the simplest possible surplus consumption difference, namely the current
level of aggregate consumption minus the level of aggregate consumption at some point
in the past. Proposition 8 computes the correlation between this variable and the current
price-dividend difference P  D/r.
Proposition 8: (Correlation between consumption change and P  D/r). In population,
the correlation between the change in consumption over a finite time horizon 1 (0, ) t and P
 D/r measured at time 1 t is
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Proposition 9 examines whether the surplus consumption difference can predict
future price changes.
Proposition 9 (The predictive power of changes in consumption). Consider a
regression of the price change in the stock market from t1 to t2on the change in
consumption over the finite time horizon (0, t1). In population, the coefficient on the
independent variable is30
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Panel C of Table 7 uses Proposition 8 to compute, for several (, ) pairs, the
correlation between the surplus consumption difference and the price-dividend
difference. Here, the surplus consumption difference is the current level of aggregate
consumption minus the level of aggregate consumption a quarter ago. The panel shows
that the two quantities are significantly correlated. Table 8 uses Proposition 9 to compute
the coefficient on the independent variable in a regression of the price change in the stock
market over some interval – one quarter, one year, two years, three years, or four years –
on the surplus consumption difference measured at the beginning of the interval. It shows
that the surplus consumption difference has significant negative predictive power for
price changes, and that the predictive power is particularly strong for low μ and high β.
Taken together, then, Panel C of Table 7 and Table 8 show that the surplus consumption
difference can be correlated with the valuation level of the stock market and with the
subsequent stock price change even in a framework that does not involve habit-type
preferences in any way.
What is the intuition for these results? After a sequence of good cash flow news,
extrapolators cause the stock market to become overvalued and hence the price-dividend
difference to be high. However, at the same time, extrapolators’ optimistic beliefs about
the future lead them to raise their consumption; while the rational traders do not raise
their consumption as much, aggregate consumption nonetheless increases overall,
pushing the surplus consumption difference up. This generates a positive correlation31
between the price-dividend difference and the surplus consumption difference. Since the
stock market is overvalued at this point, the subsequent price change in the stock market
is low, on average. As a consequence, the surplus consumption difference predicts future
price changes with a negative sign.
4.7. Equity premia and Sharpe ratios
Proposition 10 below computes the equity premium and Sharpe ratio of the stock
market.
Proposition 10 (Equity premium and Sharpe ratio). In the economy of Section 2, the
equity premium, defined as the per unit time expectation of the excess price change and
dividend, can be written as
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Panel A of Table 9 uses the proposition to compute the equity premium at an
annual horizon for several (, ) pairs. The panel shows that the equity premium rises as
the fraction of extrapolators in the economy goes up: the more extrapolators there are, the
more volatile the stock market is; the equity premium therefore needs to be higher to
compensate for the higher risk. Panel B of the table shows that it is not just the equity
premium that goes up as  falls, but also the Sharpe ratio.
5. Ratio-based Quantities32
In Section 4, we focused on quantities defined in terms of differences: on price
changes, and on the price-dividend difference P  D/r. Given the additive structure of our
model, these are the natural quantities to study. However, most empirical research works
with ratio-based quantities such as returns and price-dividend ratios. While these are not
the most natural quantities to look at in the context of our model, we can nonetheless
examine what our model predicts about them. We do this in this section.
Since analytical results are not available for ratio-based quantities, we use
numerical simulations to study their properties. In Section 5.1, we explain the
methodology behind these simulations. In Section 5.2, we present our results. In brief, the
results for the ratio-based quantities are broadly consistent with those for the difference-
based quantities in Section 4. However, we also interpret these results cautiously:
precisely because they are not the natural objects of study in our model, the ratio-based
quantities are not as well-behaved as the difference-based quantities examined in Section
4.
5.1. Simulation methodology
To conduct the simulations, we first discretize the model. In this discretized
version, we use a time-step of t  ¼, in other words, of one quarter. As indicated in
Section 3, the initial level of the dividend is 0 10 D  and the initial wealth levels are
0 0 5000.
e r W W   We further set the initial sentiment level, 0, S to the steady-state mean of
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The proposition also tells us that, from time nt to (n+1)t, we have:33
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with i {e, r}, and where ( 1) { , 1} n t n     are i.i.d. standard normal random variables with
mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1. We make the conventional assumptions that the
level of the consumption stream for the period between (nt, (n+1)t) is determined at
the beginning of the period; and that the level of the dividend paid over this period is
determined at the end of the period.
For a given set of values of the basic model parameters in Table 2, we use the
procedure described in the proof of Proposition 1 to compute the parameters that
determine the optimal portfolio holdings and consumption choice – variables such as 1,
e 
for example.
15 We then use the above equations to simulate a sample path for our
economy that is 200 periods long, in other words, 50 years long. We compute quantities
of interest from this 200-period time series – the autocorrelation of stock market returns,
say. We then repeat this process 10,000 times. In the next section, we report the average
return autocorrelation that we obtain across these 10,000 simulated paths.
16
5.2. Results
15 Here, we are assuming that the values of the derived parameters, such as 1,
e  that determine investors’
optimal policies in the continuous-time framework are a good approximation to the values of these
parameters in the discrete-time analog of our model. One indication that this is a reasonable assumption is
that our numerical results are robust to changing t from 1/4 to 1/48, say.
16 If any of dividends, prices, aggregate consumption, or aggregate wealth turns negative somewhere along
a path, we discard that path. Since the standard deviation of dividend changes D = 0.25 is very low relative
to the initial dividend level D0, this is a rare occurrence: we discard only about 1% of simulated paths.34
Table 10 presents the model’s predictions for ratio-based quantities for  
0.25 and for three different values of . For each (, ) pair, we simulate 10,000
paths, each of which is 200 periods long. For each of the 10,000 paths, we compute
various quantities of interest – specifically, the quantities listed in the left column of
Table 10. The table reports the average value of each quantity across the 10,000
paths. The last column of the table reports the empirical value of each quantity
computed using U.S. stock market data over the post-war period from 1947 to
2011.
17
We now discuss each of these quantities in turn. Most of them are simply the
ratio-based analogs of the quantities we studied in Section 4: for example, instead of
computing the standard deviation of price changes, we compute the standard
deviation of returns. However, we are also able to address some questions that we
did not discuss in any form in Section 4, such as whether the consumption-wealth
ratio or more complex formulations of the surplus consumption ratio have predictive
power for future returns.
Row 1: We report the coefficient on the independent variable in a regression
of total log excess returns measured over a one-year horizon on the log dividend-
price ratio at the start of the year. To be clear, as described above, we run this
regression in each of the 10,000 paths we simulate; the table reports the average
coefficient across all paths, as well as the average R-squared, in parentheses.
Consistent with the findings of Section 4.1, the table shows that the dividend-price
ratio predicts subsequent returns with a positive sign.
Row 2: We report the autocorrelation of the price-dividend ratio at a one-
year lag. Consistent with the results of Section 4.2, the ratio is highly persistent.
Row 3: We compute the excess volatility of returns -- specifically, the
standard deviation of stock returns in the heterogeneous-agent economy relative to
the standard deviation of returns in the rational benchmark economy. Consistent
with the findings of Section 4.3, we see that stock returns exhibit excess volatility.
17 For the nondurable consumption data, the sample period starts in 1952. Returns are based on the CRSP
value-weighted index. For the consumption-wealth ratio, wealth is computed in two different ways: the first
uses the market capitalization of the CRSP stock market, and the second uses aggregate household wealth
from the Flow of Funds accounts, following Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).35
Row 4: We compute the excess volatility of price-dividend ratios: the
standard deviation of the price-dividend ratio in the heterogeneous-agent economy
relative to its standard deviation in the rational benchmark economy. Consistent with
Section 4.3, the standard deviation of the price-dividend ratio goes up in the
presence of extrapolators.
Row 5: We compute the autocorrelation of quarterly log excess stock returns
at lags of one quarter and two years. As in Section 4.4, returns are negatively
autocorrelated.
Row 6: We report the correlation of annual log excess stock returns with
annual changes in quarterly log consumption. As in Section 4.5, this correlation is
higher than the correlation observed in the data.
Row 7: We compute the correlation between the surplus consumption ratio and
the price-dividend ratio, where both quantities are measured at a quarterly frequency.
Given the greater flexibility afforded by numerical simulations, we use a more
sophisticated definition of surplus consumption than in Section 4.6. While this definition
is still simpler than that used by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), it preserves the spirit of
their calculation. Specifically, we define the surplus consumption ratio as:
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where the superscript “a” stands for “aggregate,” and where the habit level Xt adjusts
slowly to changes in consumption:
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In simple terms, Xt is a weighted sum of past consumption levels, where recent
consumption levels are weighted more heavily. For a given , we choose n so that
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that is, we choose n so that even consumption36
changes in the distant past receive at least some weight in the computation of the
habit level. In our calculations, we set   0.95 and n  12.
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Row 7 of Table 10 shows that, as in Section 4.6, the surplus consumption
ratio and price-dividend ratio are positively correlated, consistent with the actual
data.
Row 8: We report the coefficient on the independent variable in a regression
of total log excess returns over a one-year horizon on the surplus consumption ratio
at the start of the year. Consistent with our results in Section 4.6 using a simpler
measure of surplus consumption, the surplus consumption ratio predicts subsequent
returns with a negative sign, as it does in actual data.
Row 9: Empirically, the consumption-wealth ratio has predictive power for
subsequent returns. Here, we examine whether our model can generate this pattern.
We compute the coefficient on the independent variable in a regression of total log
excess returns over a year on the log consumption-wealth ratio at the start of the
year. The table shows that the ratio does indeed have some predictive power.
What is the intuition for this predictive power? After a sequence of good cash
flow news, extrapolators cause the stock market to become overvalued. This, in turn,
increases aggregate wealth in the economy; it also increases aggregate consumption, but
not to the same extent: rational traders, in particular, do not increase their consumption
very much because they realize that future returns on the stock market are likely to be
low. Overall, the consumption-wealth ratio falls. Since the stock market is overvalued, its
subsequent return is lower than average. The consumption-wealth ratio therefore predicts
subsequent returns with a positive sign.
Row 10: We compute the annual equity premium and Sharpe ratio in our
economy.
In summary, while it is natural, in our framework, to study difference-based
quantities rather than ratio-based quantities, Table 10 shows that the ratio-based
18 When  = 0.95, quarterly consumption one year ago is weighted about 40% as much as current
consumption.37
quantities exhibit patterns that are broadly similar to those that we obtained in
Section 4 for the difference-based quantities.
6. Conclusion
Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock
market returns by extrapolating past returns: they expect the stock market to perform well
(poorly) in the near future if it has recently performed well (poorly). Such beliefs are hard
to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a
heterogeneous-agent model in which some investors form beliefs about future stock
market price changes by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors have
fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual returns and
prices. Importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor
expectations. This suggests that the survey evidence does not need to be seen as a
nuisance; on the contrary, it is consistent with the facts about prices and returns and may
be the key to understanding them.38
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
In order to solve the stochastic dynamic programming problem, we need the
differential forms for the evolution of the state variables. From the definition of the
sentiment variable,
( ) ,
t t s
t s dt dP S e
 
 
    its differential form is
. t t t dS d S d t P      (A1)
The term Stdt captures the fact that, when we move from time t to time t  dt,
all the earlier price changes that contribute to Stbecome associated with smaller weights
since they are further away from time t  dt than they were from time t; the term dPt
captures the fact that the latest price change contributes positively to St; and the
parameter  captures the stickiness of this belief updating rule. Also, the wealth of each
type of trader evolves as
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consistent with the budget constraints in (5) and (7).
As noted in the main text, the derived value functions for the extrapolators and the
rational traders are
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max , { , }. ( , , )
i
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i
s s t
i
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C
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  
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 (A3)
The assumptions that traders have CARA preferences, that Dt follows an
arithmetic Brownian motion, that Stevolves in a Markovian fashion as in (A1), and that
extrapolators’ biased beliefs in (3) are linearly related to St jointly guarantee that the
derived value functions are only functions of time, of the level of wealth, and of the level
of sentiment, but of nothing else (such as Dt or Pt). We verify this and discuss it further
after solving the model.
If we define
1
( , ; [ ], { , ) } , , ,
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i i i i i i
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e
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then, from the theory of stochastic control, we have that
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By Ito’s lemma, (A5) leads to the stochastic Bellman equations which state that, along
the optimal path of consumption and asset allocation,
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19 See Kushner (1967) for a detailed discussion of this topic.39
where
e
P g and
r
P g are the per unit time price change of the stock market expected by
extrapolators and rational traders, respectively, and where P  is the per unit time
volatility of the stock price. Note that, as stated in (3), 0 1
e
P g S    , and that
r
P g comes
from rational traders’ conjecture about the stock price process, which is yet to be
determined. Note also that, in continuous time, the volatility P  is essentially observable
by computing the quadratic variation; as a result, the two types of traders agree on its
value. We assume, and later verify, that P  is an endogenously determined constant that
does not depend on S or t. Finally, from the evolution of S in (A1), we know that
i dW and
S are locally perfectly correlated for both types of trader.
Since the infinite-horizon model is perpetual, and since, as verified later, the
evolutions of
e W and
r W do not depend explicitly on the level of the dividend or the stock
price, we know that the passage of time only affects the value functions through time
discounting. We can therefore write, for i  {e, r},
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Substituting (A7) into (A6) gives the reduced Bellman equations
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The first-order conditions of (A8) with respect to
i C and
i N are
i i C
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and
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The first term on the right-hand side of (A10) is the share demand due to mean-variance
considerations; the second term is the hedging demand due to sentiment-related risk.
We now conjecture, and later verify, that the true equilibrium stock price satisfies
.
t
t t
D
P A BS
r
   (A11)
The coefficients A and B are yet to be determined. Assuming that the rational traders
know this price equation and the true process for Dt, they can obtain the true evolution of
the stock price as
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by combining (1), (A1), and (A11). Substituting (A12) into (A1) yields
.
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From (A12) and (A13) it is clear that when B  
1, the sentiment variable St follows an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with a steady-state distribution that is Normal with mean
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r
and variance
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That is, rational traders’ future expected price change is negatively and linearly related to
the sentiment level, and P  is a constant if the conjecture in (A11) is valid.
Given the imposed belief structure that 0 1 ,
e
P g S     the extrapolators
subjectively believe that the stock price evolves as
  0 1 (
,
) 1
e D
t t dP S dt d
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
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where
e d is extrapolators’ perceived innovation term from the dividend process, which
itself follows
,
e e
t D D g dt d dD    (A16)
where
e
D g is extrapolators’ perceived expected dividend change per unit time.
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Differentiating (A11) and substituting in (A1) and (A16), extrapolators obtain
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in contrast with the price process (A12) obtained by the rational traders. Comparing
(A15) and (A17) suggests that
  0 1 ( (1 (1 . ) ) )
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That is, extrapolators’ perceived expected dividend change per unit time depends
explicitly on St. (We note that this is quite different from directly extrapolating past
dividend changes.)
Price-agreement across the two types of traders, in other words,
r e e
P P P P dP dt d dt d g g         (A19)
prevents extrapolators from seeing, through retrospection, that their belief structure is
biased, and provides a direct relation between d and d
e. Equations (A12), (A17), and
(A19) jointly confirm dividend-agreement across traders:
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We guess that the solutions of ( , )
e e I W S and ( , )
r r I W S are
20 If, instead, the extrapolators know the true process for Dt, they will believe that dPt  (0  1St)dt +
Pd, a price process that, given that B/(1  B)  0  1, clearly deviates from the true process in (A12)
. In other words, even after a time interval of length dt, extrapolators will, in principle, be able to learn that
their beliefs are wrong.41
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Substituting (A21) into the optimal consumption rule in (A9) and the optimal share
demand of the stock in (A10) yields
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For the extrapolators, substituting 0 1
e
P g S    and the price equation (A11) into
(A23) gives
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Substituting the price equation (A11), the form of
e I in (A21), the optimal consumption
e C in (A22), and the optimal share demand
e N in (A24) into the reduced Bellman
equation (A8) for the extrapolators, we obtain the following quadratic equation in S:
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which is equivalent to three simultaneous equations:
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These three equations determine the coefficients ,
e a ,
e b ,
e c 0
e  , and 1
e  as
functions of the coefficients A and B. If, as we assume, extrapolators know the belief
structure of the rational traders as well as the parameters  and Q, it follows that they can
go through the intertemporal maximization problem for the rational investors (specified
below) and figure out the price equation (A11). As a result, extrapolators know the
coefficients A and B, and through equations (A26), (A27), and (A28), they can solve for
their optimal share demand ,
e N as well as for their value function .
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We now turn to the rational traders. Using
r
P g and P  from (A14), the form of
r I
in (A21),
r N from (A23), the optimal share demand of the stock from extrapolators in
(A24), and the market clearing condition (1 ) ,
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Substituting the price equation (A11),
r
P g from (A14), the form of
e I in (A21), the optimal
consumption
r C in (A22), and the optimal share demand
1
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reduced Bellman equation (A8) for the rational traders, we obtain another quadratic
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which is equivalent to three simultaneous equations:
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These three equations determine the coefficients A, B, and .
r c Equations (A26)-
(A28) and (A31)-(A33) are the mathematical characterization of the endogenous
interaction between rational traders and the extrapolators. The procedure for solving these
simultaneous equations is left to the next section of the Appendix.
The fact that the conjectured forms of Pt, ,
e I and
r I in (A11) and (A21) satisfy the
Bellman equations in (A8) for all Wtand Stverifies these conjectures, conditional on the
validity of the assumption that Wtand Stare the only two stochastic state variables. To
verify the latter, note that the price equation in (A11), the optimal consumption rules in
(A22), and the fact that the solutions of
e
t N and
r
t N are linearly related to St jointly
guarantee that the evolutions of
e
t W and
r
t W in (A2) depend explicitly only on St. Lastly,
the derived evolution of the stock price in (A12) verifies the assumption that P  is an
endogenously determined constant. This completes the verification procedure.
Equations (A11), (A12) and (A13), (A24), and (A22) confirm equations (9), (10),
(11), (13), and (14) in the main text, respectively, and equations (A7) and (A21) together
confirm (12). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
B. Solving the Simultaneous Equations
To solve equations (A26), (A27), (A28), (A31), (A32), and (A33), we group them
into three pairs of equations and solve each pair in sequence. First, we use (A26) and
(A31) to determine
e a and B, where, in turn, we use (A14), (A24), and (A29) to express
, P  1
e  , and
r a as functions of
e a and B. Second, we use (A27) and (A32) to determine
e b and A, where, in turn, we use (A24) and (A29) to express 0
e  and
r b as functions of
,
e b A, and B. Lastly, we solve each of (A28) and (A33) to obtain
e c and ,
r c respectively.
The fact that the value function ( , , )
i J W S t is multiplicatively separable in W, S, and t
simplifies the model and ensures tractability. For instance, our model has the feature that
the discount factor  only affects optimal consumption and optimal wealth, but not the
equilibrium price: for both types of investor, optimal share demand is unrelated to .
C. Proof of Corollary 1
When all traders in the economy are fully rational, (A21) reduces to
( ) ,
r r r W r I W e K
    (A34)
where K is a constant to be determined. Substituting (A34) into (A10) and using ,
r N Q 
we know that the equilibrium stock price is44
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This third term on the right-hand side of this equation shows that Pt is pegged to the
current level of the dividend; the other two terms capture dividend growth and
compensation for risk. Substituting (A34) and (A35) into the Bellman equation (A8)
determines the coefficient K as
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From (A9), optimal consumption is
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From (A2), (A35), and (A37), optimal wealth evolves according to
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This completes the proof of Corollary 1. 
D. Proof of Corollary 2
Differentiating both sides of (A11) gives
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If there is positive cash-flow news that increases the stock price by , then, from (A39),
the presence of sentiment in the equilibrium price will push the price up by a further
amount B, and then by a further amount 
2B
2, and so on. The total price increase due
to a shock of size  is therefore
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
 

  (A40)
This geometric series converges if and only if 1  |B|  0. That is, the price equation
(A11) is an “equilibrium” price equation if and only if 1  |B|  0.
When all investors are extrapolators (  0), the market clearing condition implies
2
0
0 2 ,
e
e P
P
rA b
Q
r
 





 (A41)
2
2 1
1 1 2 0
2
2 0.
e
e e P
P
P
rB a
rB a
r
   
    

   (A42)
Substituting (A42) into (A26), we obtain
2 2
1 1 0 [ 2 1 ] ( ) 2 ) (2 [ (1 )].
e e e
P a B a r a r                 (A43)
Under the condition that 1  2, (A43) implies 0.
e a  Given this, (A42) then implies that
1 / . B r  (A44)
Since the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of the conjectured equilibrium
is 1  |B|  0, (A44) now means that a necessary condition for existence is45
1 . r   (A45)
We have not yet shown the sufficiency of this condition; to do so, we need to check
(A27) and (A28) to see whether we can determine A, ,
e b and .
e c Substituting 0
e a  and
(A44) into (A27), we obtain
1 unless 0 ( 1).
e b r     (A46)
With 0,
e b  we then obtain, from (A41), that
2 2 1 1 2
0 0 1 (
.
1 ) P D Qr Q r r
A
r r
          
  (A47)
Now substituting 0, 0,
e e a b   (A41), (A44), and
(1 )
D
P B r





into (A28) gives
2 2 2
1 2
1 2(1 )
log( ).
D e Q r
c r
r r r

  




   (A48)
Quite generally, then, we can solve for A, ,
e b and
e c if condition (A45) holds. Therefore,
we can claim that (A45) is both a necessary and sufficient condition.
We note that this proof does not rule out any nonlinear equilibria. 
E. Proofs of Propositions 2 to 10
The statistical properties of the sentiment process St can be derived by studying a
related process, ,
k
t
t
t e Z S  which evolves according to
.
kt
kt D
t S dZ d
ke
d e
g
r
t     (A49)
Unlike the sentiment process, the Zt process has a non-stochastic drift term, and is
therefore easier to analyze. We use this process repeatedly in our proofs of Propositions 2
to 6.
E.1. Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward to calculate the price change expectations of rational traders.
Combining extrapolators’ belief about the instantaneous price change, (A15), and the
differential definition of the sentiment variable, (A1), we find that extrapolators’
subjective belief about the evolution of St is
0 1 ( 1) [ . ]
e
t t S S d dS dt          (A50)
Extrapolators believe that
e  is a standard Wiener process. This means that, from the
perspective of extrapolators, the evolution of ,
m e
t
t
t e Z S  where m  (1  1), is
0 .
mt m e e
t S
t e d d Z e d t      (A51)
Using the statistical properties of the
e
t Z process, as perceived by extrapolators, we obtain
(22). When m  0, applying L'Hôpital's rule to (22) gives (23). 
E.2. Proof of Proposition 3
From (A11), we know that46
     
1 1 1
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 / , co c v , o cov , v . t t t D r P P P S S S S B D r D B
        (A52)
It is obvious that  
1 0 0 v . , 0 co t S D D   Using the properties of the Z process, we can
show
 
1
1
2
0 0
(
c v , .
1 )
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t e
S S S
k
 
 

 (A53)
We also obtain
   
2 2
2
0 0 0 var / var
2
.
SB
D r P S
k
B

   (A54)
Equations (A52), (A53), and (A54) then jointly give (26). 
E.3. Proof of Proposition 4
For the autocorrelation structure of P  D/r, we know from (A11) that
 
1 1 0 ) co , ( . rr PD t S S t   (A55)
We can show that
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(A56)
It is straightforward to show that
1
2
0 var( ) va / ( 2 . r ) t S S S k    Putting these results
together, we obtain equation (27) in the main text. 
E.4. Proof of Proposition 5
From the price equation (A11), we know that the variance of price changes is
given by
       
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2
0 0 0 0 0 var co v v , ar 2 . var t t t t t P P S S S S D B Br r D D D
          (A57)
The quantity  
1 0 var t S S  can be expressed as
      1 1 1 1
2
0 0 0 0 var va , r t s t s t t S S S S s S S s S S                         
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where the subscript s means that we are conditioning on S0  s. We can show
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Using the properties of the Z process, we also find that
1
1 0 0 ) (1 ,
D
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r
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and47
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Substituting (A59) and (A60) into (A58) gives
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1
1
2
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k
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t e
S S
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  
  (A62)
Substituting (A61), (A62), and
1
2
0 1 var( ) t D D D t    into (A57) gives equation (28) in the
main text. Combining the price equation (A11) with (A62) leads to (29). 
E.5. Proof of Proposition 6
From (A11), we know that
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Using the properties of the Z process, we obtain
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and
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In addition, since the increments in future dividends are independent of any random
variable that is measurable with respect to the information set at the current time,
   
1 3 2 1 3 2 0 0 cov , cov , 0. t t t t t t D D D D S S D D       (A66)
Substituting (A64), (A65), and (A66) into (A63) yields the first equation in (31). The
second equation in (31) is derived in Proposition 5, and the third equation can be derived
in a similar way. 
E.6. Proof of Propositions 7 to 9
From the budget constraints (A2), the price equation (A11), and the optimal
consumptions (A22), we know that aggregate wealth evolves as
2 . ) ( W t W t W W S b S c dt d dW a       (A67)
Substituting this into (A22) yields
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(A68)48
To compute
1 1 0 0 cov , ( ) t t C C P P   and
1 0 var( ), t C C  we first need to compute the
covariance of every combination of two terms in the last line of (A68). For example, one
of these covariances is
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The other covariance terms can be computed in a similar way. Rearranging and
simplifying terms, we obtain (33), (35), (37), and (39). Equation (34) has been derived in
Proposition 5. 
E.7. Proof of Proposition 10
Substituting the equilibrium price equation (A11) and its evolution (A12) into our
definition of the equity premium,  
1
t t t dP D dt rPdt
dt
   , gives (40) in the main text. For
the Sharpe ratio, by the law of total variance,
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Combining (40) with (A70) gives (41). 
F. Estimating 
Estimating equations
Our objective is to estimate the model parameters , 0, and 1 using the survey
data.
Suppose that we have a time-series of aggregate stock market prices with sample
frequency t (we use t  ¼ for quarterly data). Then, at time t, the proper discretization
of (A1) is
1
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n
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 

Here, the weighting functions are parameterized by  and
by n, which measures how far back investors look when forming their beliefs. These
weights must sum to 1.
21 The derivation of (A69) makes use of Fubini’s theorem. We have checked that the conditions that allow
the use of Fubini’s theorem hold in our context. For more on these conditions, see Theorem 1.9 in Liptser
and Shiryaev (2001).49
The key assumption of our model is that extrapolators’ expected price change (not
expected return) is
0 1 [ ]/ ). (
e
t t t dP dt S       (A72)
The expectation in (A72) is computed over the next instant of time, from t to t  dt, not
over a finite time horizon. In the surveys, however, investors are typically asked to state
their beliefs about stock market performance over the next year. It is therefore not fully
correct to estimate (, 0, 1) using (A72). We must instead compute what the model
implies for the price change extrapolators expect over a finite horizon. We do this in
Proposition 2 of the paper, and find:
1
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1
0 1 1 1 0 2
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where 1). (1 m   
The first term on the right-hand side of (A73) is extrapolators’ expected price
change at time t, 0 1 , s   multiplied by the time horizon, 1 . t t  (For example, t1  t  0.5
for a six-month horizon). The second term captures extrapolators’ subjective beliefs
about how the sentiment level will evolve over the time horizon, 1 , t t  The parameters (,
0, 1) enter here in a non-linear fashion.
To determine (, 0, 1), we therefore estimate both
1 1 1 0 1 ) , ˆ ˆ ˆ)]( [ ] [ (
e
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and
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with 1 1 ( ) ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , (1 m      and ˆ) ( t S  constructed as described above. We also estimate
equation (A75) for the special case where 1 is fixed at 1. In this case, equation (A75)
becomes:
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Survey data
We estimate equations (A74), (A75), and (A76) using the Gallup survey data
studied by Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) and others. We start with the “rescaled”
version of the series described in that paper. After the rescaling, the reported expectations
are in units of percentage expected returns on the aggregate stock market over the
following 12 months. We then convert this series into expected price changes by
multiplying by the level of the S&P 500 price index at the end of the month in which
participants have been surveyed. That is,50
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The resulting Gallup series comprises 135 datapoints between October 1996 and
November 2011. The data are monthly but there are also some gaps.
We estimate equations (A74), (A75), and (A76) using nonlinear least squares
regression. We use 60 quarters of lagged price changes in the S&P 500 price index when
constructing S above. We report coefficients and t-statistics based on Newey West
standard errors with a lag length of 6 months.
Coefficient Equation (A74) Equation (A75) Equation (A76)
β 0.49 0.44 0.68
[t-stat] [6.50] [5.77] [10.73]
λ0 0.09 0.07 0.07
[t-stat] [30.24] [35.41] [36.18]
λ1 1.35 1.32
[t-stat] [8.70] [9.48]
R-squared 0.77 0.74 0.75
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Table 1: Selected Models of the Aggregate Stock Market
Model
allows for
intermediate
consumption
D/P
predicts
returns
Accounts
for
volatility
Accounts
for
equity
premium
Accounts
for
survey
evidence
TRADITIONAL
Habit Campbell and Cochrane (1999) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Long-run risk Bansal and Yaron (2004) Yes No Yes Yes No
Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2012) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Rare disasters Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) Yes No No Yes No
Gabaix (2012), Wachter (2013) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
LEARNING
Timmerman (1993) Yes Yes Yes No No
Wang (1993) Yes Yes Yes No No
BEHAVIORAL
Preference-based
Prospect theory Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Ambiguity
aversion Ju and Miao (2012) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Belief-based
Noise trader risk DeLong et al. (1990a) Yes Yes Yes No No
Campbell and Kyle (1993) Yes Yes Yes No No
Extrapolation of
fundamentals
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) No Yes Yes No No
Choi (2006) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Fuster, Hebert, and Laibson (2011) Yes Yes Yes No No
Alti and Tetlock (2013) No Yes Yes No No
Hirshleifer and Yu (2013) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Extrapolation of
returns
Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990) No Yes Yes No Yes
DeLong et al. (1990b) No Yes Yes No Yes
Hong and Stein (1999) No Yes Yes No Yes
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) No Yes Yes No Yes
Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer
(2013) Yes Yes Yes No Yes55
Table 2: Parameter Values
The table reports the values we assign to the risk-free rate r; the initial level of the dividend 0; D the per unit time
mean gD and standard deviation D of dividend changes; the risky asset per-capita supply Q; the initial wealth levels,
0
e W and 0 ,
r W of extrapolators and rational traders, respectively; absolute risk aversion ; the discount rate ; the
parameters 0, 1, and  which govern the beliefs of extrapolators; and the proportion  of rational traders in the
economy.
Parameter Value
r 2.50%
D0 10
gD 0.05
σD 0.25
Q 5
0
e W 5000
0
r W 5000
 0.1
 1.50%
λ0 0
λ1 1
 {0.05, 0.5, 0.75}
 {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}56
Table 3: Predictive Power of D/r  P for Future Stock Price Changes
The table reports the population estimate of the regression coefficient when regressing the price change from time t
to time t  k (in quarters) on the time t level of D/r  P for k =1, 4, 8, 12, and 16, and for various pairs of values of
the parameters μ and β:
( ) / ε t k t t t t k a b D P P r P        .
The calculations make use of Proposition 3 in the main text.

 k 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05
1 - 0.014 0.016 0.022
4 - 0.055 0.064 0.085
8 - 0.106 0.124 0.162
12 - 0.155 0.180 0.233
16 - 0.201 0.233 0.298
0.5
1 - 0.134 0.161 0.219
4 - 0.438 0.504 0.628
8 - 0.684 0.754 0.861
12 - 0.822 0.878 0.948
16 - 0.900 0.940 0.981
0.75
1 - 0.194 0.232 0.311
4 - 0.579 0.652 0.774
8 - 0.822 0.879 0.949
12 - 0.925 0.958 0.988
16 - 0.968 0.985 0.99757
Table 4: Autocorrelations of P  D/r
The table reports the autocorrelation of P  D/r at various lags k (in quarters) and for various pairs of values of the
parameters  and . The calculations make use of Proposition 4 in the main text.

β k 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05
1 - 0.986 0.984 0.978
4 - 0.945 0.936 0.915
8 - 0.894 0.876 0.838
12 - 0.845 0.820 0.767
16 - 0.799 0.767 0.702
0.5
1 - 0.866 0.839 0.781
4 - 0.562 0.496 0.372
8 - 0.316 0.246 0.139
12 - 0.178 0.122 0.052
16 - 0.100 0.060 0.019
0.75
1 - 0.806 0.768 0.689
4 - 0.421 0.348 0.226
8 - 0.178 0.121 0.051
12 - 0.075 0.042 0.012
16 - 0.032 0.015 0.00358
Table 5: Volatility of Price Changes and Volatility of P  D/r
Panel A reports the standard deviation of annual price changes for various pairs of values of the parameters μ and β;
Panel B reports the standard deviation of P  D/r, measured at an annual frequency, for various pairs of μ and β. The
calculations make use of Proposition 5 in the main text.
Panel A: Standard deviation of annual price changes

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 10 11.20 13.15 17.43
0.5 10 11.17 13.03 16.86
0.75 10 11.04 12.67 15.90
Panel B: Standard deviation of annual P  D/r

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 0 1.21 3.19 7.53
0.5 0 1.32 3.42 7.77
0.75 0 1.25 3.20 7.0959
Table 6: Autocorrelations of Price Changes
The table reports the autocorrelations of quarterly stock price changes at various lags k (in quarters) and for various
pairs of values of the parameters μ and β. The calculations make use of Proposition 6 in the main text.
Autocorrelations at horizon k

 k 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05
1 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007
2 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007
3 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007
4 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007
8 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006
12 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006
0.5
1 0 -0.016 -0.038 -0.079
2 0 -0.013 -0.032 -0.062
3 0 -0.012 -0.027 -0.048
4 0 -0.010 -0.022 -0.038
8 0 -0.006 -0.011 -0.014
12 0 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
0.75
1 0 -0.022 -0.054 -0.110
2 0 -0.018 -0.041 -0.076
3 0 -0.014 -0.032 -0.053
4 0 -0.012 -0.024 -0.036
8 0 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008
12 0 -0.002 -0.003 -0.00260
Table 7: Consumption, P  D/r, and Price Changes
Panel A shows the correlation between quarterly changes in consumption and quarterly changes in price; Panel B
shows the correlation between annual changes in consumption and annual changes in price; Panel C shows the
correlation between P  D/r and quarterly changes in consumption. The calculations make use of Propositions 7 and
8 in the main text.
Panel A: Correlation between quarterly consumption changes and quarterly price changes

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 1 0.994 0.985 0.984
0.5 1 0.929 0.842 0.840
0.75 1 0.903 0.794 0.792
Panel B: Correlation between annual consumption changes and annual price changes

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 1 0.994 0.985 0.984
0.5 1 0.947 0.878 0.876
0.75 1 0.935 0.853 0.849
Panel C: Correlation between quarterly consumption changes and P  D/r

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 - 0.152 0.148 0.148
0.5 - 0.436 0.398 0.409
0.75 - 0.504 0.446 0.45661
Table 8: Predictive Power of Changes in Consumption for Future Price Changes
The table reports the population estimate of the regression coefficient when regressing the price change from time t
to time t  k (in quarters) on the most recent quarterly consumption change for k  1, 4, 8, 12, 16, and for various
pairs of values of the parameters  and :
1) ε ( t k t t t t k P P a b C C         .
The calculations make use of Proposition 9 in the main text.

 k 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05
1 0 -0.011 -0.026 -0.053
4 0 -0.043 -0.101 -0.205
8 0 -0.084 -0.195 -0.393
12 0 -0.123 -0.284 -0.565
16 0 -0.159 -0.366 -0.722
0.5
1 0 -0.107 -0.214 -0.442
4 0 -0.350 -0.671 -1.266
8 0 -0.547 -1.003 -1.738
12 0 -0.658 -1.168 -1.914
16 0 -0.720 -1.250 -1.979
0.75
1 0 -0.144 -0.270 -0.552
4 0 -0.429 -0.759 -1.375
8 0 -0.609 -1.023 -1.686
12 0 -0.686 -1.115 -1.756
16 0 -0.718 -1.147 -1.77262
Table 9: Equity Premia and Sharpe Ratios
Panel A reports annual equity premia for various pairs of values of the parameters  and ; Panel B reports annual
Sharpe ratios for various pairs of  and . The calculations make use of Proposition 10 in the main text.
Panel A: Equity premia

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 1.25 1.58 2.19 3.91
0.5 1.25 1.65 2.46 4.88
0.75 1.25 1.66 2.48 4.92
Panel B: Sharpe ratios

 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
0.05 0.125 0.140 0.165 0.220
0.5 0.125 0.143 0.173 0.233
0.75 0.125 0.143 0.172 0.22763
Table 10: Model Predictions for Ratio-based Quantities
The table summarizes the model’s predictions for ratio-based quantities. A full description of these quantities can be
found in Section 5.2 of the main text. The values of the basic model parameters are given in Table 2, and  (the
fraction of rational traders) is 0.25. For   0.05, 0.5, and 0.75, we report estimates of each quantity averaged over
10,000 simulated paths. In rows (1), (8), and (9), we report both a regression coefficient and, in parentheses, an R-
squared. The right-most column shows the empirical estimates for the post-war period from 1947-2011 (1952-2011
for consumption-related quantities because nondurable consumption data are available only from 1952).
Quantity of interest
 Post-war U.S. stock
market data 0.05 0.5 0.75
(1) predictive power of
log(D/P)
0.29
(0.20)
0.46
(0.22)
0.45
(0.21)
0.11
(0.08)
(2) autocorrelation of P/D 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.94
(3) excess volatility of returns 2.32 2.91 2.97 -
(4) excess volatility of P/D 7.21 4.85 4.55 -
(5) autocorrelation of log excess return (k = 1) -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 0.11
autocorrelation of log excess return (k = 8) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(6) correlation between Δ4c and
x
t r 0.72 0.54 0.47 0.32
(7) correlation between surplus consumption and
P/D 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.10
(8) predictive power of
the surplus consumption ratio
-0.27
(0.15)
-0.89
(0.18)
-0.77
(0.17)
-0.77
(0.09)
(9) predictive power of
log(C/W)
0.51
(0.15)
0.12
(0.15)
0.01
(0.15)
0.02
(0.03)
0.33
(0.05)
(10) equity premium 1.16% 1.62% 1.64% 7.97%
Sharpe ratio 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.44